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In the Supreme 9>urt
of the State of Utah
In the Matter of the Estates

•

of
WILLIAM ROBERT \X/lLLfAJ\.lS, also
kno,vn as WILLIAl\1 R. \Xl I l~I..IAl\.fS,
and SARAH CORLESS WILLIAMS,

Deceased.

Case No.
9093

GLADYS WILLlAi\lS~ also known as
T 1\N fA KAROL,

Petitioner and

Ap pel/ant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT·.

STATElvfFNT OF FACTS

On September 12~ 1958~ William Robert Williams died
intestate in Salt Lake City~ having been predeceased by his
\\·.ife. Sarah Corless Williamsj who also died intestate: On
September 26~ 1958~ Inez Williams Warshaw filed a P~tition
for Letters of Administration (R. 1-4) in \vhich she claimed

3
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to be the only heir of William Robert Williams (R.. 3) ; and

on October 28 she was appointed adminis tra tr ix of the estates
of both W iltiam Robert and Sarah Corless Williams (R. 8).
On February 27, 19 59, appellant filed a. verified petition alleging~ inter alia, that as the adopted daughter of decedents she
\vas entitled to inherit from Wi l tiam Robert Williams on a.n
eq u aI basis w tih Inez W i 1l iams Warshaw ( R+ 31) . The trial
court thereafter permitted an amendment to the petition setting
du t that appellant was en tided to inherit £rom decedent5 by
virtue of a contract in which they promised to adopt her;
the rea f te r the parties proceeded as if an amended petition had
been :fi 1ed. In her petition appellant also described the content)
of an holographic will written by William Robert William)
in September of 19 56, read by appellant) and believed by
appellant to have been in existence at the time of death of
Will jam Robert Williams. The Administratrix filed an answer
denying those all ega. tions in appellant~ s petition ( R. 23) . On
June 5, 1959~ the administratrix~s Motion for Summary JudgT
ment was granted by the Hon+ Stewart M. Hanson (R. 54).
The order, in addition to dismissing the petition, purported
to .find facts as follows:
That there V~-ras no valid holographic will existing
at the time of the death of the Oecedants William R.
\\·. illi.am s and Sarah Corless Williams or e.i ther of them.
~·1.

··2. That the Petitioner Gladys Williams, also known
as Tania Karol, was not and never was the adopted
daughter of Decedents \XF i1liam R~ Williams and Sarah
Corless Williams or either of them.

·[3. That Juring arl times mentioned herein there
was no vaJid and enforceable agreement by Decedents
William R. \X' illiams and Sa.rah Corless Wili lams, or
4
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either of thtm, to adopt Petitioner. Gladys Wililams,
also known as Tania Karol u. ( R. 5~-54) .
It is well settled that on a Motion for Sum~ary .Judgment

the moving litigant must show that there is no genuine issue in.
respect to any material fatt and that he is entitled to .a judg~
ment as a matter .of ·law; also that all substantial doubts are to
be reso1ved against him. Aceo rdingl y, the facts to be con5idered in determining w beth er the trial court's act ion was
proper are tho~e found in the pleadings, appellant's .ans~~ers
to interrogatories, and the deposition of Inez \Villiams Warshaw. The facts the trial court was obligated to consider are
set out below.
When appellant was about three weeks old she was taken

by members of the Relief Society of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, with permission of her natural mother,
Mrs~ Carroll, to the home of the Williamses to be cared for
unti 1 such time as Mrs~ Carro 1i was physitall y and financially
able to care for the child (R. 44). When appellant was about
one year oldJ Mrs. Carroll felt capable of caring for the child
and went to the home of the Williamses for the purpose of
taking the child back (R. 44) . On her arrival at the Williams
home Mrs. Carroll was told that Mrs~ Williams health had
been delicate, that she had prev io usl y lost a child and could
bear no more childr~nt that she had come to Jove appellant
t

if appellant were taken from

her~

medical complications might result (R. 45). Mrs+ Carroll
asked to consent to the W illiamses' keeping appellant
raising her as their own. She v.,ras to1d that if she gave
consent the Williamses would love appellantj give her
same :schooling and opportunities as their own daughter,

Vto~as

as her own child, and that

and
this

the
and

5
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raise her as their own child ( R. 4S) . Mrs. Carro 11 then con~
sented to such an arrangement but at first did not want to sign
any papers in connection with release of her child (R . 42).
When she was about two years old, appellant's natural
father and mother \vere divorced in .a proceeding in the District
Court of Salt Lake County) State of Utah. The Court in th~

action f ouD d that the Wi lliarnse~ were raising appellant io
their O\\'fi home v.rith the knowledge and consent of both the

Carrolls. Money was awarded to Mrs~ Carroll for support of
appe1lant's natural sister but not for appellant (R. 46).
At about this time Mrs. Carroll, in the company of her

teenage son went to the office of Ben Johnson, a Salt Lake
l

City attorney, for advice regarding appellant (R~ 42). The
WiJliamses \\'ere insisting upon adoption of appellant (R. 42)J
and 1·"1 r. Johnson to Id Mrs. Carroll that this was the tbest wa?-·
( R. 42) . Short! y after this meeting with the attorney Mrs.
Carroll, upon her return home one day~ said she had ~·signed
[appellant J a\va.y'' and had been required to promise not to
try to see appellant or tell her, if they ever met, that she w.as
appellanfs mother (R~ 42) ~
t

During appellant's infancy her natural mother came to
the Williams home on at least one occasion for the purpose of
taking back the chi 1d~ whereupon appellant was hidden by the
Wi1l1amses (R. 67, p. 9). However, 1-Ir.s. Carroll went away~
apparently satisfied~ and there is no indication that any legal
action was commenced to regain the custody of her child.
When appellant was eight or nine years old she was told

by a neighbo(s child that she was not the child of the Wil6
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liamses but ~·as adopted (R~ 45). She was comforted by
the Williamses and the Warsha·ws and assured that she was
not adopted but was the child of the Williamses .(R .. 45).
A certificate of birth (R. 41) vtas entered. of record May
5, 1918)

by the Church of Jesus Chri5t of Latter-day Saints,

ce rt tf yi ng, among other things~ that appe11 ant ~vas born March
18, 1910~ at Salt Lake City~ Uta:ti, and that her parents v.tere
\Xl" illiam R. Willi am s and Sarah Cor1css "'V./ i l tiams.
After appellant was an adult decedent William R. Williams
purchased a burial plot for her adjacent to that of a son vlho
had previously died ( R. 4 5) .
Appellant ¥t'aS held out to the world as the daughter 'of

the Wi~lia.ms and was regarded as a sister by the ad min is tra t rix,
Inez Williams Warshaw (R. 67, p. 3)~ Appellant di~ ··not
knuw that she was not the natural daughter of the Williamses
until she Viras fourteen year so1d at which time she \Vas to Id

by a schoolmate that she had been adopted (R. 46).
From appellant's infancy until the decedents~ deaths tl:).ere

were close parent -chi Jd rel a ti onships ~ ~n d during that time
decedents continually held appellant out to the worJd as their
child~ referring to themselves as he.r ·~loving parents~' (R. 46).

STATEldENT OF POINTS
1. A trier of fact could find that a contract to adopt appel-

lant was entered into by decedents William Robert Williams
or Sarah Cor less Williams or both.

7
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2. A contract to adopt, when fully performed by the

natural parents and their child) will be specifically enforced.

I
A TRIER OF FACTS COULD FIND THAT A CONTRACT TO ADOPT APPELLANT WAS ENTERED INTO
BY DECEDENTS WILLIAM ROBERT WILLIAMS OR
SARAH CORLESS WILLIArviS OR BOTH.
The development of facts evidencing occurrences of almost

50 years is a cliff icul t and time-consu1ning task. It may be
facilitated and shortened by the use of discovery procedures;
but in this instance the administratrix and the. court have insisted

t.hat appellant prove her case now-not at a trial. To place
this burden upon appellant the administratrix has not even
been required to submit aH idavits as to what she contends
the true facts to be. It is an odd procedure and an unusual
burden; even if it were proper appellant has .shown facts
sufficient to establish a con tract to adopt: the signing away!!
of the infant child; the lavryer ~ s advice; the final acquiescence
of the natural mother. Time rna y make other proof available
(if weight is the p roble.m) ; but facts already in the record
tend to prove the contract~ assumption of custody and control
of appellant by the Williamses; relinquishment of custody
and con tro 1 by the natural parents; tb e W illiarnses ho!ding
appellant o~t to the ~:rorld as their child and telling appellant
throughout childhood that she \1Jr'a5 their natural~ not even
adopted child; giving appellant their name; causing her to
be baptized as their own child; a continual pattern of the
4

t

8
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relationship of parents and child throughout. the Williamses
lifetime.
·.' .i'.:'. ·~ ·: f.:•: •.:.
Many cases have dealt with the validity of and the quantum
of proof necessary to establish contracts to ad opt; and the
courts have realistically recognized that such a ~ontract usuaUy
~ust be proved by evidence other than a parchment scrollsigned~ sealed and tied with b Iue ribbon.
In 1Vionahan v~ Monahan ( 195 8) 14 IlL ( 2d) 449) 15 3
I\TE 2d 1, the Supreme Court of Illinois approved the finding
of an oral contract to adopt, the finding having been based
4-poo evidence quite similar to that before the trial court tn
th~. instant case.
.

.
4

· Testimony showed that the natural mother '_gave'!· the
quasi adopted child to the adoptive. parents when the child ~ras
six years old. The adoptive parents had the child baptized in
their o·wn name when the child \Vas nine years old. They
entered the chi 1d in schooL as their ·~adopted · child,~' con.
tin uall y referred to the cb i1d as their son~ and in turn were
·by the child referred to as his ~~mom and dad."·. The. child
conducted him.sel f as a loving and dutiful child. and the adoptive
parents continued to hold themselves out at his parents~ ·The
question, in this case, was whether or not- a contract to adopt
could be established purely by circumstantial . evidence~ The
Court said:
~~certainly

a contract to adopt as any other fact may
be proved by circumstantial e~id ence, provided that
evi ~ence meets the requisite tests of suffici enty ~''
.

.

The same viewpoint \Vas adopted in Roberts

-

v~

Rober!J
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( 1915) ~ 223 Fed. 775, by the United States Court of Appea!.s
for the Eighth Clrrui t, the Court saying:
~'The

argument by which we are asked to reverse the
decree is that there \Vas no direct or clear evidence of
an agreement to adopt at the time Myra J Roberts ~ras
received in to the family of Char1es Roberts. There is
good reason why such evidence is wanting+ All of the
parties to the transaction are dead~ and Myra J. Roberts
.;vas herself a. babe at the time of the adoption. It seem~
to us that in such a case it i.s not necessary that the
court first have direct proof of the making of the
con tract, and then proceed forward from the contract
thus established to the conduct evidencing its exist~
encc. We think 1t is possible to reverse that proce~s,
and if the statements and conduct of the adopting parents are such as to furnish dear and sa tlsfactory proof
that an agre-ement of adoption must have existed~ then
the agreement may be fouod as an inference from that
+

evidence.'t

In In re Garcia's Estale ( 1940) 45 N. M. 8~ 107 P.2d
866, the plaintiff had been taken into the home of the decedents
when she was about seven years old4

The decedents had

promised the plaintiff~ s uncle, who stood in Joc o parenti J to
adopt her. From this time on she was continually held out to
the world both as the decedents~ daughter and as their adopted
daughter) was baptized with the name of the decedents) entered
in school by the decedents and given away in marriage by the
decedents in conformance to a Spanish custom+ The pro.tni.se
to ad opt was never fulfilled. The question, in this case was
one of sufficiency of proof, a New Mexico statute requiring
cor ro bora tion in suits against heirs. 1n u pho Iding the decree
for specific performance of the contract to adopt) the Court
j

l

said~

10
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~·

**~

the agreement may be established eitner as

an express or implied contract provided the p.roof
offered is of the convincing character required in cases
of this kind * * * . It is not necessary that tb e corroboration of the plain tiff rs testimony be afforded· by direct
e:vidence. If this is not available,· the corroboration
•1 , ·} , .._ required. by the statute rna y arise from circu.rnstances .' :r
In Van Tine v. Van Tine (Nr J.) 15 Atl. 249~ there was
no written agreement of any kind~ but the qua;i adopted

child's father gave the child to the adoptive parents when the
child was only a few moQ. ths oldr The child was raised by the
quaii adoptive parents, baptized by them and given their
name, by which name the child was always cal~ed~ both by the
adoptive parents and neighbors and relatives. The _child was
raised in the belief that she was the natural chHd of her adoptive
parents J and did not learn different! y until she was. over the
age of 18. The adoptive parents left a will, giving to the
virtually adopted child much of their property, but leaving
other prope:rty not disposed of. The Court hetd that the parol
agreement to adopt would be enforced~ and the child entitled
to inherit the property as if s.he had been adopted according

to the statutes .
Furman v. Craine ( 1912) 18 Ca.L 41~ 121 Pacr ,\'..1007,

involved an alleged written agreement to adopt)' wherein __the
parents forever surrendered to adoptiye parents tpe _control,
custody and society and relinquished all claims an9- ! igh_ts to
th~ child, but !?e complete in~trument_ was not foQnd or enter~q
in .ey.idence~. _Only !•a mutiliated copy,. conta.in~ng ljtt~e of ~he
substance of the agreement'' was introduced. F~rthe~ testim~ny
showed that the natural parents tel eased the contra1~ cus to<;ly
.ll
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and society ot the four-year-old child and from that time on,
the quasi adoptive parents took charge of the child and raised
her as a member of the family~ and that the child, throughout
her life, until the death of the quasi_ adoptive parerits, conducted herself at all times as a dutifu] child. The Court decreed
specific p cr f ormanc e of the con tract and held that the chi 1d
Vot' as entitled to j nherit the decedents property as if a natura 1
child+
t

The record in the instant case contained sufficient evidence

that there was a contract to adopt. More~
overl •t also contained material from which it should have
been apparent to the trial court that other evidence might be
obtained by appellant prior to trial time. Accordinglyl the
judgment should be reversed since~ as shown below~ contracts
to adopt are spee ifi call y enforceable.
to support a :finding

II

A. CONTRACT TO ADOPT, WHEN FULLY PERFORMED BY THE NATURAL PARENTS AND THEIR
CHILD~

WILL BE SPECIFICALLY

ENFORCED~

The above point is a para phrase of a 1egal rule accepted
by the great majority of courts that have been asked to enforce
contracts to adopt. The view is referred to in 2 C.J .S., Adoption,

§ 27 ( 6) ~

p. 399)
'~

as follows:

* * * Under the principl e that equity will consider

that done which ought to have been done, the a uthoriti es very genera 11 y establish the pro position that a
contract by a person to adopt the child of another as
his own~ accompanied by a virtual, although not a

12
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statutory . adoption, and acted upon by both parties
during the obligor's life, may be en£ore ed~ upon the
death of the obligor, by adjudging the child entitled
to a natural child!s share in the property of the obligor
who dies without disposing of his property by will.=-~
This cout t has not specifically considered the enforceability
of contracts to adopt; but enough courts have found them
en£o.rceabl e that the numbers--even without the reasonsmight tend to establish the soundness of the view that such

contracts should be enforced. The following cases are represen ta_ti ve ~ not exhaustive.
A leading ~nd frequently cited c_ase i.s Che hak v. Batt! es
( 1907) 133 Iowa 107, 110 N.W. 330~ in which a quasi adopted
child claimed a right in the estate of the deceased quasi adoptive
parents~ pursuant to a :'ritten agreement sig~ed hy the child's
natural mother~ and the deceased quaJi adoptive parents J
which contract recited that the natural mother gave the quasi
adoptive parents her child for the purpose of ·adoption, and
stated that .such child '"[shall be named as they shall seem fit,

and bear the name of Battles". and the quasi adoptive parents
covenanted ~that they and each of them accept the rights,
!

duties and retations of a parent to this child, and shall in
all respect be that of a child born to themselves in the state
of wedlock, and that the same shall include all of the rights
of inheritance by law. ~ A statutory adoption was never at~
j

ternpte d.

The Court decreed that the contract should be

speci.fically en farced regardless of the statu tory requirements
for a completed adoption. In its opinion~ the Court said:

"Though a contract of adoption could not be. sustained in common law" the courts of equity enforce

13
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such con tracts \~· hether oral or in ,v ri ting vl i th respect
to property rights invo]ved * * * . The obligations
of such a contract as of others are mutual, and the
peculiarities of it, such as emphasize the right of him
who has faith fu 11 y performed his part of it to that
portion stipulated by the other party. It. is impossible
to estimate by any pecuniary standard the value to
the parties r€ceiving a child) nor is tbere any design
of so measuring the service and soffice bestowed~ The
nature of the con tract necessarily precludes a] I thought
of returning the consideration, and after the mother
has yielded the posses sian of her child with all that
this means, and it has lived until rna j ori ty as a dutiful
and loving son or daughter with those who have prom.
ised to cherish him or her as their own., and that he
or she sh.all share their estate~ it is beyond the power
of the adopted parents or the courts to place the mother
or chi td in the situation in which they were before the
agreement was entered into. There is no such thing
in cases like this as placing the parties in status quo f
and the remedy must be specifically enforcing the contract or tb e denial of rip;h ts which have been fully
earned, and in good conscience aod justice ought to be
enforced . ''

California courts will enforce contracts to .adopt. See 2
Cal. Jur~ 2d 424; also~ In re Radovith s Estate ( 1956), 48
Cal. 2d 116, 308 P+ 2d 14~ in which the Court said:
1

~~There

can be no question but tbat the agreement
was valid~ and that Judge Oark correctly decided
George is entitled to distribution of all of the estate
of the decedent."

This case was concerned di r cctl y \\-' i th the question of
whether or not) for inheritance tax purposes, the quasi adopted
child was entitled to the exemption granted by statute to a
14
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natural or adopted child, but the Court expressed no concern

over the lower court decreeing specific performance of an oral
agreement to adopt a seventeen·year-old child, where there
~ad been no statutory adoption but the agreement had been
fully performed on the part of the child, and the natural
parents had relied on this agreement+
In Fisher vlo Davidson ( 1917) 2 71 ~lo. 195, 195 S. W.
1024, a husband and wife had assumed possession and control
of a threer year -old child under an agreement to take .and raise
her as their own child, the child to assume the name o £ the
adoptive parents. They took the child into their home~ changed
her name and thereafter until death, a considerable period of
time, treated her as their child, she being commonly known
in the circle in which they moved as their child. The Court
held that in equity she would be deemed to be the adopted
child and entitled to inherit the property of her adoptive

parents.
In Ezell v. Mobley ( 192 5) 160 Gar 87~, 129 S.E. 5 32,
the Court held that a para1 obligation to adopt a child of
another aceompanied by a virtual, though not a statutory~
adoption, is suHicient to ~arrant the enforcement of such obli.
gation in equity by decreeing the quasi adopted child to ·be
en titled to a natural child· s share in quasi adoptive parents)
estate, in the event of the Ia tter . s intestacy, and upheld the
right of a virtually adopted child to . contest the will of her

£oster

parents~

Many other cases) in a substan tl:al number of jurisdictions~
recognize and enforce contracts to adopt, both written and
oraL See_ 2 A.L.R~ 1190; 69 A~L.R. 35; 33 A.L.R. 741; In re
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Biehn's EJtate ( 1933) 41 Ariz+ 403~ 18 P.2d 1112; Wooley v.
Shell Petroleum Corporation ( 1935) 39 N.M. 256~ 45 P.2d
927; Bedal v. Johnson ( 1923) 37 Idaho 359, 218 Pac. 641;
In re Stoibeis EJtate ( 1937) 101 Colo . 192~ 72 P.2d 276; Wright
v. Wright ( 1894) 99 Mrch. 170, 58 N+W. 54; Mfflvttin t.
ilfcEivain ( 1902) 171 Mo. 244, 71 S~W~ 142~ Burns k Smith
( 1898) 21 Mont. 251, 53 Pa.c. 742.
It takes an Alice- in~ Wonder land type of imagination to
conceive any reasons of public policy that would prevent a child

from sharing in his de facto adoptive parents estate merely
because the parents had failed to do what they promised to do.
The right of a child to inherit has nothing to do with the formalities necessary, under our adoption statutes, to foreclose
natural parents from reclaiming their children; and Ta}'lor t'.
W addou ps ( 19 52) 121 Utah 279, 241 P .2d 15 7, involving a
dispute between natural and adoptive parents over custody of
a child, does not touch our problem.
1'

We are concerned with property rights here. Where does
the parents~ property go~ and ho'v? Should the promises and
ex pecta ti ons of t be decedents be given effect~ or should a
non-participant in the transaction receive a windfall because
of a failure to act as promised? This court has not hesitated
to s peci fica ll y enforce con tracts under which property is to
be disposed of in a certain way upon death. See Randall r.
T racy-C'ollins T fUJI Company ( 1956) 6 Utah 2d 18] 305
P.2d 480; Van Cott v. Brinton ( 1983) 8 Utah 480~ 33 Pac.
218; and f/ an Natta v. Heywood ( 1920) 57 Utah 376, 195
Pac. 192.

If contracts to leave property may be enforced specifi.cally,

16
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why not contracts to adopt, at least insofar as they affect dis position of property. As the Court sa.id in Chehak t:. Battles, cited
supra, p~ 33 3:
·~If a contract with an adult to convey or will property

in consideration of services rendered may be enforced
by such an adult, and one for "lW' hose benefit a contract
has been made may enforce it [in this state]~ upon
\vhat tenable theory shall the Court~ upon demand of
a child who has met all the obligations imposed, deny
specifi.c performance of the solemn agreement of a
deceased person who, upon the ample consideration of
the sur render of such chi 1d by its natural parent~ w.i th
the privilege of naming it and the benefits derived
from its care) custody, and services, has promised that
such child shall share in or take all of his estate, and
has died without providing for the execution of his
promise ? To so decree is not to a ward the right to
inherit, which depends on status, but to enforce a
contract for the disposition of property, and there is
no reason for denying an infant the right to such relief
when it is £reely accorded to an adult.~~

CONCLUSION

It is not c1ear from the record just v-,r hat the basis of the
trial court's ruljng was~ We would have felt safe in presuming
that the basis was a belief that contracts to adopt are nqt
enforceable against the e.s tate of the deceased prom issor ~ but
the court~ s inclusion .in its order of what appear to be fin dings
of fact has raised some question in our minds as to whether
the court weighed the various evidence 01 meant to. indicate
in its order that the matters before it made it appear to a
certainty that there could be no satisfactory proof of a contract
17
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to adopt. We submit that the evidence outlined would be

.sufficient to make out a con tract to adopt; and if it is not~ the
petitionees answer to interrogatories makes it appear that
there is or may be additional evidence of a written contract
to adopt-evidence \v hich the petitioner was not given an
opportunity to obtain. Accordinglyl it would appear that the
court has not interpreted the rules, particular1y the summary

judgment

rule~

in such a manner as to obtain substantial justice.
hand~

if the cou rf s ruling \\-'as based upon
a view that contracts to adopt are not enforceable, we submit
that the view is er ron eo us and opposed to a s.u bstantial weight
of judicial authority. Admittedly the state . s adoption statutes
require that certain £ormali ties be followed in order to accomPlish a vaLid adoption. But the adoption statutes are primarily
for the protection of children and natural parents. It is appror
0 n the other

priate that the 1egislature would not wish to have the rights
o £ the natur a.l parents, and the right o £ the child to live with
its natural parents~ taken away except under closedly guarded
procedures. That the interest of the child is of paramount im~
portance is pointed out in Taylor t·. W addoups supra. But here,
we are not concerned with the rights betw'een the natural
parents~ the adoptive parents and the child. The adoption
was an ac:com plished fact~ whether the formalities were followed or not. It is a fact that the child lived out her childhood
with the adoptive parents, that the natural parents relinquished
control, that there was no dispute as to the :right to custody.
The parties concerned recognized the adoption+ The oniy
person who does not recognize the adoption is one who stands
to benefit~ monetarily, by taking refuge in technicalities of an
adoption statute and in the passage of time+ Throughout their
18
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lifetimes Mr. and Mrs. Williams received the benefits of the

de fa,to adoption. Mrs. Williams had the affection that she
needed and filled the void left by the loss of her own child and
her jnability to bear

another~

Throughout childhood and adult-

hood the appellant continued in her relationship a.s a child
.and was considered to be a child by the only other principals
involved.
Whether the petitioner can prove a completed de jure
adoption or not~ and it is not certain at this point that she
cannot, the contract to adopt ought to be enforced a.nd the
expectations of the decedents fulfilled. As this court said in
Van Natta v. Heywood et ai. ( 1920) 57 Utah, 376:~ 195 Pac.
192t supra:
u

***

If the courts

"V~t·ere powerless~

as a matter

of equity~ to carry out the in tent and purposes of the
deceased to fulfill his expressed promise in agreement
with the plaintiff, so repeatedly admitted and always
acted upon by the plaintiff> then indeed would they
be helpless to award that which the inherent justice
of a case demands.~'
The judgment. of the District Court should be reversed
and the case remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Dudley M. Amoss
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Alto rn eys for Petitioner and A ppel/ant
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